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Abstract
In recent years, the study of labor supplyhas occupied the attention
of a large number of economists. With
the growth in interest in the topic
and with the inevitable diversity of economicmodels and statistical
methods proposed by new entrants in the field,the literature has developed
its own folklore. The principal legend is thatthe empirical estimates
of the same parameters obtained from the setof available studies display
such diversity that they are of little use to policymakers. This paper
disputes the folklore. We claim thatthere is more agreement than
disagreement once a few reasonable criteriabased on recent theoretical
work are used to eliminate certain studies from
consideration, and once
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In recent years, the study of labor supply hasoccupied the attention of a
great number of economists. Both the availability of new sources of data, andthe
recurring desire of policy makers to be able to estimate the labor supplyresponse
to alternative programs of welfare reform have combined to stimulatean immense
volume of theoretical and empirical work on thetopic. Elaborate "experiments" have
been conducted in order to provide estimates ofresponses to social programs.
With the growth in interest in the topic and with the inevitablediversity of
economic models and statistical methods proposed by new entrants In thefield, the
literature has developea its own tolkiore. Inc principallegend is that the
empirical estimates of the same parameters obtained from the set of availablestudies
display such diversity that they are of little use to policy makers. Thisargument
was advanced in defense of the enormous cost of collecting "experimental"data to
resolve the apparent ambiguity in the empiricalevidence on labor supply behavior.
The fact that analyses of experimental data haveproduced a range of estimates
comparable in width to those produced by more traditional datasources apparently
only serves to strengthen the original observation.
This paper disputes the folklore. We claim that there ismore agreement than
disagreement once a few reasonable criteria based on recent theoreticalwork are
used to eliminate certain studies from consideration, andonce we are careful about
posing the question we seek the estimates to address.
I. The Use of Labor Supply Functions in PolicyAnalysis
The needs of policy analysis arevery specific. The goal of the policy evaluator
is to estimate the response toprograms that have been proposed but have never been
observed in operation. To make such estimates, it isnecessary to adopt a model——
either explicitly or implicitly——in order topredict likely policy impacts.
Oie way to justify the widespread appeal of the negative income taxexperimentswas that they offered a "model free" approach to the evaluation of policy. If an
"experiment" could be conducted that closely resembled a proposedprogram, no model
building was required in order to assess the impact of the program. As is evident
from the literature this hope was iflusory.1 It is now clear,especially in the
work of Hausman and Wise2, that experimental data require as much andpossibly more
care in their analysis than traditional data, in large part because of initial
administrative decisions used to create samples and because of self—selection decisions
by experimental participants. It is now widely recognized that the experiments did
not and could not directly estimate the likely impact of a widespreadlong duration
negative income tax.
Like it or not, we are stuck with the need for a model to interpret data andto
make policy forecasts. However, no single model can be said to beuniversally accepted
by economists who work on labor supply. Nonetheless, the theoretical model thatunder-
lies most interpretations of data in this field is the neoclassicaltheory of consumer
choice under certainty. Most workers in the field adopt itas the starting point,
and indeed, it seems that every paper now writtenon the subject demonstrates to the
reader the point——already apparent to Hicks3——that the economics oftime is a special
case of the theory of consumer choice. This is not tosay that the basic model has
not been extended; indeed, there is a considerable volume ofactivity associated with
such extensions. However, we stick to the old model——on whichconsiderable empirical
evidence has been accumulated——and do not shift to eachnew model that comes along
until evidence is accumulated that a new model isa genuine empirical improvement on
the old.
The working assumptions in the neoclassical model asconventionally applied in
practice are (1) that consumers face an exogenousgross wage rate (thus, tax rates,
equalizing differentials payments, and the like are ignored); (2) theappropriate
theoretical time dimension for the analysis is (conveniently) theone at the analyst's
disposal, e.g., annual hours of work, participation in a week, etc. (thus, lifecycle3
considerationsare ignored, as are interrelationships among different dimensions of
labor force activity); (3) labor supply behavior can be characterizedby the classical
theory of consumer choice, complete with its optimality conditions that setmarginal
benefits equal to marginal cost (thus, fixed costs, nonlinearbudget sets, corner
solutions, and the like are ignored, and unemployment and uncertainty are neglected).
All of these assumptions have been challenged in newpapers in the literature.
But because much of this work is so new, little consensus onempirical estimates from
the new models has emerged. In: our view, this lack ofagreement is only a transitional
phenomenon. Unknown to most practitioners in the field, a consensus in fact existsin
the studies based on the conventional analysis.
It is by now well known that estimates from the neoclassical modelcan be used
to predict the labor supply response to socialprograms. For example, Masters and
Garfinkle4 and Ashenfelter5demonstrate how estimates of the standard labor supply
function can be used to predict (a) participation ina negative income tax program,
and (b) the reduction in hours worked by participants. Inview of this work, we
spare the reader a restatement of this point. Instead we ask the question "which of the
available estimates should be used in such simulations?" In thisregard, it is
helpful to focus attention on a few studies for primeage males enshrined in a survey
by Cain and Watts6 that are based on the traditional model. The laborsupply response
of prime age males is of central concern topolicy makers and has received the most
attention in the empirical literature. For thesereasons, as well as for the sake of
brevity, we focus attention on this group. The Cain—Watts estimatesare presented in
Table 1. All of these studies share the following featuresin common: (a) they are
based on cross section survey data; (b) theyare for prime age males (the Fleisher,
Parsons and Porter study is based on older. males45—59, while the other studies are
more broadly based); (c) "cross effects" of wife's labor forceactivity on husband's
hours of work are ignored; (d) all studies focuson an annual measure of labor supply.
The diversity in the estimates is enormous. But howmany of these estimates wouldTABLE 1
















4.Greenberg—Kosters —.09 .20 —.29
5.Hall —.18 to —.45 .06 —.24 to —.51
6.Hill —.21 to —.34 .47 to.52 —.68 to —.86
7.Kalachek—Raines .55 .86 to.96 —.31 to —.33
8.Masters_Garfinkled .01 to —.11 —.04 to.06 -.06 to -.12
9.Rosen_Weiche — .27 .14 —.41
aAdapted from Cain and Watts, Table 9.1,pp. 332—333. For references and descriptions
of the papers see Cain and Watts.
bThis is defined as W.(Th/Y) whereW is the wage rate, (Dh/Y) is the effect of
a change in unearnod income on hours worked. See Cain and Watts.
CThese estimates (reported by Cain and Watts)are only oneofthe many estimates
reported in this study.
dmis study replaces Garfinkle'sanalysis in the Cain and Watts volume with
Garfinkle's latest estimate of these effects reported in Masters and Garfinkle, Table
5.7, p. 95.
is the estimate for urban workers using hourlywage rates and annual hours
worked (Table 1, Col. 1 of Rosen and Welch), ratherthanithe estimate reported by
Cainand Watts which was based on a regression of annual hours on weekly earnings.
As Rosen and Welch point out,thislatter procedure leads to an upward bias inthe
estimatedwage effect.we judge to be of interest in the light of recent work? To answer this question we
first introduce some new results from the literature.
II. A Summary of Recent Results
The neoclassical theory establishes a relationship between hours of work (h),
wage rates (W) and unearned income (Y). This relationship can be written for a
consumer who equates marginal benefits to marginal costs as:
(1) h =
a0+ a1W + ct2Y +E,
whereis a portmanteau variable of unobservables. Estimates of the parameters in
this function are required to perform the policy simulations mentioned earlier. All
of the studies listed in Table 1 purport to estimate
a1 and ct2.It is Our contention
that for three reasons not all studies, in fact, estimate these parameters.
(a) Sample Inclusion Criteria and the Choice of the Dependent Variable
All of the studies listed in Table 1 claim that is uncorrelated with W and Y.
But in many studies this claim is untenable. Consider, for example, the studyby
Kalachek and Raines. In this study, households with incomegreater than twice the
Social Security Administration's low cost budget income level were excluded. The
rationale for this exclusion is that the authors seek to explore the laborsupply
behavior of poor people. The implicit notion behind this restriction isa "culture of
poverty" concept——that poor people have different labor supply behavior than others,
and that poverty is a static concept.7 The work of McCall8 belies the secondargument——
there is a lot of turnover in and out of poverty. The firstargument may be correct,
but the authors run the risk of manufacturing selection bias byusing only a sample of
poor men on which to estimate their functions.
To illustrate, suppose is a random variable with mean zero in a random sample
of data. Restricting an empirical analysis topoverty samples, we select from a random
sample of men with identical values of W and Y those men with a lower thanaverage value
of .Thisis so since poverty is defined by total income I,Holding W fixed and increasing Y, the average value ofmust decrease for the selected
sample if consumption is a normal good. Moving acrossgroups with the same Y, but
higher values of W, implies that the average value ofmust decrease provided that
certain empirically plausible conditions hold.9 To summarize,a regression fit on
a selected sample may be written as
(2) h =+ct1W + ct2Y + E(Iselectjon rule) + V
where "E(Elselection rule)" is the expected value of the unobservables forthe selected
sample. This term decreases with Y and with W suggesting that estimates basedon
"poverty samples" will tend to produce downward biased estimates ofa1 and a2 since
the analyst ignores how the sample is generated and hence omits theterm "E( selection
rule)" from his equation. "VI' is uncorrelated with the otherright—hand side
variables by construction.
The papers numbered [3], [4], [6], [7], and [9] in Table 1present labor supply
estimates based on low income samples, and hence suffer from this bias.Given the very
high income cut off employed in studies [3] and [4] we feel that the incometruncation
problem is less pronounced in these studies. One cannot, a priori,say that there is
no merit in stratifying samples. People who are poor have different laborsupply
behavior than others. Studies by Heckman1° and Burtless and Hausmanreveal considerable
dispersion in preferences for work. However, inducing selection biascan manufacture
apparent differences in estimated labor supply parameters between rich andpoor.
There is a related inclusion bias that affects the analysis insome of the other
papers: the choice. of dependent variable used in the empirical work. For example,
Hall seeks to explain the labor supply of all workers. Ifa worker does not work any
hours, he receives a zero in the Hall analysis and is pooled in thesample with
workers. As noted by Lewis'2, Ben—Porath13, and others, theParticipation function
differs structurally from that of the hours of work decision. Theprobability that
someone participates is P(W, Y). The effect of achange in W and Y on P is not the
same as the effect of a change in W and Y on h given inequation (l)J4 The hours of
work fUnction for workers is given by equation(2) with the selection rule being "somework in the survey period."
The Hall paper essentially estimates a regression approximation to
(3) h =P(W, + + + E(j"some work") + V)
=+lw+ + v*
Hall'sestimates of and 2 do not correspond to and a2, respectively. His
estimates confound parameters of the participation function with theparameters of the
true structural hours of work Lunction. It is the latter that are required forpolicy
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analysis.
Superficially, it would seem that this consideration is more important for the
labor supply of secondary workers than it is for the labor supply ofprime age males
who have high participation rates. However, DaVanzo, DeTray and Greenberg16demonstrate
that in their sample of prime age males, adding in "zero hours worked" observations
into the sample raises the estimated value of thewage effect on labor supply. Their
evidence is consistent with the notion that participation probabilitiesare related
to wage rates.
To summarize, there are two sources of bias: (a) "zero hours of work"observations
do not lie on the structural labor supply function, and (b)restricting estimates to
subsamples of individuals with positive hours of work may result in selection bias.
Themethod proposed by Hall of pooling "zeros" with continuous observations hasno
analytical justification,and the evidence in DâVanzo et al suggests that estimates
based on his procedure overstate the true value of the structuralwage elasticity.
A related point about sample inclusion bias can also be made aboutother definitions
of labor supply used in the literature. For example, the Masters andGarfinkle estimates
reported in Table 1 are based on a labor supply measure obtained byadding hours worked
to hours unemployed (or on strike) for labor forceparticipants. This is an appropriate
measure only if individuals are surprised by involuntary unemployment (orstrikes). An
alternative view of unemployment advanced by Lucas and Rapping17views unemployment time
as another form of leisure activity so that only measured hours ofwork are relevant inestimating labor supply functions. A third view of unemployment as search activity
advanced byBurdett and Mortensen18 suggests a separate equation for unemployment time.
There is no convincing evidence on which of these three views is correct.19
If, in fact, the behavioral function that characterizes unemployment differs from
that of hours worked, the Masters—Garfinkle estimates are a weighted average of the two
functions. This combined function is of little structural interest and certainly is not
abasis for providing estimates of equation (1). This point highlights a glaring
omission inthe theoretical model currently used to evaluate policy——it ignores
unemployment. The model of Burdett and Mortensen provides the first step towards a
framework that accommodates labor supply and turnover behavior.
There is another source of sample selection that is somewhat more subtle. Studies
[4], [7], and [9] defined annual labor supply as annual weeks worked (or in the labor
force),times hours worked in the week preceding the survey. As noted by DaVanzo et al
(pp. 95—96), if a worker did not work in the week precedingthe survey his annual hours
areestimated to be zero. If higherwage workers are more likely to have worked inthe
surveyweek, this source of measurement error——or selection bias——results in an upward
biased estimate of the effect of wages on labor supply. DaVanzo et al present evidence
that this point is empirically relevant.20
(b) Use of Work Related Transfers as Unearned Income
Since the original observation by Mincer, economists have been warned against using
transfer payments and income transfers that are a result of labor supply choices as a
determinant of those choices. Such a procedure builds a spurious negative relationship
between income (as measured) and labor supply. Studies [6] and [9] include welfare
and unemployment payments in Y andnotsurprisingly estimate large negative income effects.
The remaining studies are not entirely clean on this point either. Since measured unearned
income is largely a consequence of past work effort, it is likely that it is correlated
with error "s" in equation (1). To purge this bias, Greenberg and Kosters (study [4])
and Ashenfelter and Heckman (study [1]) use instrumental variables in an attempt to
correct for any bias that results from this source.(c) Measurement Error in W and Y
Survey data are ridden with error. It is well known that data on unearned income
is measured with error. Unless instrumental variable methodsare used (or the measurement
error is somehow corrected) as in studies [1] and [4], the estimated value of the
income term is biased toward zero.
Studies [6], [7], [8], and [9] define thewage rate as the ratio of earnings (in
a time unit, usually a year) to labor supply. If labor suply is measured witherror,
the effect of the use of this measure is to bias the estimate ofa, downward.
Other studies ([1], [2], [4], [5]) based on the Survey of EconomicOpportunity
(SEO) data are not entirely free of measurement error either. Thewage measure used
in these studies is constructed by dividing "normal"weekly earnings by actual hours
worked in the survey week. Apart from the fact that this variableis not available
for workers who supply no hours during thesurvey week, error is induced by transitory
fluctuations in hours of work in the survey week,biasing a1 toward zero.
In order to circumvent themeasurement error bias inwage rates, and to predict
missing values of the wage, some studies ([2], [5]) predictwages by running a
regression on the sample of workers for whom wage data are available topredict a wage
for observatiojis with missing values and for the balance ofthe sample as well. This
procedure seems attractive because it appears to solve twoproblems at once:(a) a
missing data problem, and (b) an error in variables problem.However, this claim is
quite misleading. For two reasons, such "instrumental" variable estimatesmary, in fact,
be an important source of error. First, thewage data are missing nonrandomly. Low
wage individuals are the ones more likely to be missing fromwage samples and hence the
imputation procedure overstates the missingwage. If hours of work are correctly measured,
the imputation procedure biases the estimatewage effect downward. Second, if the imputed
wage is divided into the earnings to estimate labor supply (as in [2] and[5]), any error
in measuring wages is transmitted to thedependent variable and hence theestimatedwage
coefficient has an additional downward bias.21III. Our Choice of Estimates: Uncertainty Reduced
Inour judgment, the evidence is sufficiently clear that studies [6] and [9]
should be eliminated from consideration as a source of estimates for policyanalysis.
Both studies are based on "poverty samples" with the income inclusion criterion much
more stringent than that used in the other studies. Moreover, they both definewage
rates by dividing earnings by labor supply and hence induce a negative bias in the
estimated wage effect. Finally, both also include work determined transfers in the
measure of unearned income.
The study by Kalachek and Raines is unusual for its high estimated substitution
elasticity. This elasticity is based on a definition of labor supply that combines
the wage effect of participation with the wage effect on hours. Forreasons discussed
earlier, this estimate is of little interest in policy evaluation. Nonetheless, it is
much higher than that estimated by Boskin who also presents an estimated substitution
elasticity that combines the participation and hours decision. In our judgment, this
difference arises, in large part, from the stringent low income criterionemployed by
Kalachek and Raines (and not employed by Boskin). Their criterion results ina sample
with a lower than average participation rate. Since much evidencesuggests that the
participation—wage relationship is nonlinear (becoming virtually flat at very high
wage rates), it is not surprising to find a much greater estimated wage—participation
relationship in their analysis than in that of Boskin. These arguments lead us to drop
the Kalachek—Rajnes estimates from further consideration.
Eliminating these three studies greatly reduces the range in the estimates. The
study by Hall [6] appears discrepant. The most surprising comparison is the contrast
between his estimates and those presented by Boskin [2] which are basedon almost
exactly the same data set. We believe this discrepancy arises from the manner in which
Cain and Watts chose to summarize the Hall study. Theyrepresent an evaluation of wage
effects for a given level of ("whole") income and family composition. The Boskin
estimates should be interpreted as a simplesummary of Hall's estimates for the fullsample, in a format comparable to the other studies in the table. This observation
further narrows the range of uncertainty.
The Boskin study is based on a pooled sample of workers and non—workers. Thus
it estimates an equation like (3), combining participation and structural parameters.
However, in view of his virtually inelastic participation function, it is not surprising
to find that his estimates are closely in accord with the estimates for studies [1],
[3], and [4] that are essentially based on samples of participants. As expected,
his estimated wage effect is slightly more positive than that found in the three studies
just cited, but the difference is too slight to be taken seriously.
The only truly discrepant study remaining in the table is that of Masters and
Garfinkle. Their estimates are derived from two data sources: the SEC and the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). The estimates based on the PSID are dominated by
one extreme observation which when removed from the sample leads to agreement in the
estimates from the two samples. The SEQ based estimated income elasticity (—.06)and
uncompensated wage elasticity (.01) are larger than the remaining estimates in the table.
Much of this discrepancy can be traced to Masters and Garfinkle's definition of labor
supply as the product of weeks in the labor force times 40 if the observation normally
works "full time" or would like to work full time, or 20 if the individual voluntarily
works part time. This treatment of hours worked per week flattens the estimated
relationship between hours per week and wage rates——a relationship known to be negative
for the wage measures used by Masters and Garfinkle (see DaVanzo et al)—--and.hence
results in an upward bias in their estimated wage effect. Further, their measure gives
greater play to the weeks—wage relationship which is known to be positive. Similarly,
if unearned income reduces hours worked per week——as the theory predicts——their rather
unusual treatment of hours worked per week leads to an understatement of the wealth effect.
For these reasons, we drop the Masters—Garfinkle results from further consideration.
When this is done, the agreement in estimated elasticities is much closer than
is assumed to be the case. The range in uncompensatedwage elasticities is from —.19to —.07. The range for income elasticities is —.29 to —.17. These estimates imply
that the effect of a negative income tax of a $2400 income (1966 dollars) guarantee
and a 50 percent tax rate on covered male labor supply would be to reduce male labor
supply by 8 to 15 percent in covered families.
IV. Summary, Conclusions and Qualifications
This paper has demonstrated that independent estimates of prime age male labor
supply functions based on cross—section data display less diversity in the estimated
coefficients than is commonly assumed to be the case once a few reasonable criteria
are applied to evaluate existing studies.
We have focused our attention on the labor supply behavior of the group most
frequently analyzed——prime age males——and have deliberately kept tc he traditional
model most often utilized to interpret labor supply behavior. In choosing this
demographic group, and the most elementary model of labor supply, we have abstracted
from a host of problems discussed extensively elsewhere.22
Nonetheless, e find that the agreement among the reasonable estimate3 recorded
in Table 1 is remarkable especially in view of different samples used, treatment of
taxes, and control variables employed in the surviving studies. In our judgment, the
range of admissible estimates could be and will be further eliminated as the data,
theory, and empirical technique improve.
However, it is important to note that each study in our table can be faulted.
We have pointed out these flaws, and have eliminated the most flagrantly biased
estimates. We have not used all the criteria outlined in Section II to eliminate the
studies under consideration. The agreement in the remaining studies may arise either
from the lack of practical importance of the potential defects we have mentioned, or
because. of a happy coincidence of offsetting errors.FOOT NOTES
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